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Abstract
Recent work on decision making and planning for au-
tonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods
to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that
methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this
problem are susceptible to an issue that we refer to as con-
flict. Our results show that when conflict occurs, it causes
suboptimal and potentially dangerous behaviour. In response,
we develop a theoretical framework for analysing the extent
to which such methods are impacted by conflict, and apply
this framework to several existing approaches modelling in-
teraction between agents. Moreover, we propose Augmented
Altruism, a novel approach to modelling interaction between
players in a Stackelberg game, and show that it is less prone
to conflict than previous techniques.
1 Introduction
A wealth of previous research on autonomous driving has
employed overly simplistic models of how other agents will
behave, such as assuming constant velocity (Eiras et al.
2020; Sadigh and Kapoor 2015; Bender et al. 2015) or that
vehicles only execute a small number of fixed trajectories
for a given type of manoeuvre (Hermes et al. 2009; Ward
et al. 2017). These assumptions lead to unexpected and un-
desirable behaviour, like failing to merge onto a highway or
change lanes because the autonomous vehicle (AV) is not
capable of anticipating that starting such a manoeuvre will
result in the human drivers making space for the AV to finish
completing the manoeuvre. The emerging field of interac-
tive planning and decision-making for autonomous driving
aims to address these problems by building interactive mod-
els that allow an AV to influence the actions taken by human
drivers (Sadigh et al. 2016, 2018). For example, the scenario
presented in Figure 1a; the AV (orange) is approaching a
parked fire truck with a vehicle (purple) occupying the ad-
jacent lane. Operating under the assumption that the purple
car will continue to move at a constant velocity, the AV has
no choice but to slow down and wait until the right lane is
empty in order to continue. In contrast, an AV that is capa-
ble of anticipating how an interactive driver would respond
to its actions might decide on a different course of action.
For example, Sadigh et al. (2018) demonstrate an interactive
planner that enables the AV to begin accelerating in order to
determine whether the purple car will slow down to allow it
(a)
C2
GW C
C1
LCB (−∞,−∞) (0, 1)
LCA (1, 0) (−∞,−∞)
(b)
Figure 1: (a): Motivating Example; Car 1 (Orange) is in the
left lane approaching a stopped fire truck. Car 2 (Purple) is
in the adjacent lane. Dotted lines depict the options avail-
able to each vehicle; Car 1 must change lanes ahead of Car
2 (LCA), or behind Car 2 (LCB). Car 2 can either maintain
their current velocity (C) or give way (GW) to allow Car 1
to merge onto the lane. (b) Reward matrix associated with
the motivating example; Car 2 would prefer to continue, and
Car 1 would prefer to change lanes ahead of Car 2. Diagonal
entries in table represent states where the cars collide or nei-
ther satisfies their objective, which is mutually undesirable.
to change lanes in front.
It is common in recent work to on autonomous driving
to develop hierarchical systems, where a discrete decision-
maker decides on intents or approximate trajectories for the
AV, and a lower level motion planning system chooses con-
tinuous actions that realise these decisions (Fisac et al.
2019; Albrecht et al. 2020; Eiras et al. 2020; Cunningham
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et al. 2015). Incorporating models of interaction based on
Stackelberg games into AV planning and decision-making
systems has become a popular way of improving upon the
naı¨ve models used by older systems that do not attempt to
account for the interactive behaviour of other drivers. How-
ever, while solving Stackelberg games is computationally
easier than alternative game theoretic formulations, the so-
lution method presumes that players (i.e., the AV and other
driver) take the role of either leader of follower, with the
leader selecting their action first and the follower selecting
their best response. In practice, without a means of direct
communication and agreed upon protocol, it is impractical
for two vehicles to dynamically allocate the roles of leader
and follower. Given that the roles of leader and follower
are ambiguous, the assumptions required for a Stackelberg
game do not always hold in autonomous driving scenarios.
This begs the question: will the violated assumptions result
in undesirable behaviour?
We use the term conflict to refer to a class of situations
where ambiguity over who takes the roles of leader and fol-
lower leads to unexpected behaviour. We demonstrate that
such conflicts can result in suboptimal or unsafe behaviour,
such as both vehicles coming to a stop in an attempt to
give way to each other, or both vehicles aggressively try-
ing to move into the same space. In addition, we propose
a metric—the Area of Conflict (AoC)—for quantifying the
extent to which a given Stackelberg game-based decision-
maker will result in conflict. This metric can be seen as a
measure of robustness to the level of aggressiveness or pas-
siveness exhibited by other agents in the driving environ-
ment. Using the insight provided by our conflict analysis
we design the Augmented Altruism method, a technique for
interactive decision-making that is less susceptible to con-
flict than previous approaches. Our approach is based on the
concept of altruism (Andreoni and Miller 1993) from game
theory, which we extend to account for reciprocal altruistic
considerations of other agents.
The key contributions in this work are as follows:
• Identification of a shortcoming in previous work on in-
teractive planning and decision-making for autonomous
driving that we refer to as conflict.
• The introduction of a metric, Area of Conflict (AoC), for
measuring the incidence of conflict for a pair of decision-
makers in a Stackelberg game formulation.
• We propose Augmented Altruism, a novel method for
decision-making that is provably less prone to conflict
than other methods in literature for reasonable reward val-
ues.
2 Related Work
Our method is an extension of the concept of Altruism,
as found in Game Theory literature. Andreoni and Miller
(1993) presents the idea of altruism being a scalar value, α,
that multiplies or adds with the rewards of the interacting
agents to influence an agent’s decision-making by the po-
tential payoffs to the other agents. In the work, Andreoni and
Miller provide three distinct models for altruism: pure, duty
and reciprocal. The definition used in this work most aligns
with the definition for pure altruism. (Bansal et al. 2018) in-
troduce selfishness, an equivalent, but opposite concept to
our proposed definition, which is used for collaborative au-
tomotive planning.(Du¨ring and Pascheka 2014) presents a
method for decision-making for autonomous vehicles that
corresponds to the pure altruism model, with an altruism co-
efficient of 1.
Similar to altruism in Game Theory, there is Social Value
Orientation (SVO) in the fields of psychology and be-
havioural economics (McClintock and Allison 1989). SVO
can be used as an indicator for a person’s reward alloca-
tion preferences over. Unlike altruism, which is restricted to
depicting egoistical or prosocial behaviours, SVO can also
identify malicious or masochistic behaviours in decision-
makers. Schwarting et al. (2019) implement a version of
SVO that is similar to our proposed altruism implementa-
tion in that they weight the planning agent’s reward, and the
rewards of the other agents according to the planning agent’s
SVO value. As in (Sadigh et al. 2016), the authors model the
interaction as a Stackelberg game and demonstrate that SVO
can be used to augment lane merge prediction. In contrast, in
this work we use our proposed method as a decision-making
model. In (Schwarting et al. 2019) the SVO model requires
access to a single, accurate reward function to model the be-
haviour of any other agent, which is learnt offline. In our
work we weaken this requirement, using Game Theoretic
methods to choose the most appropriate reward function to
model the behaviour of other vehicles.
Sadigh et al. (2016) present an approach to interactive
planning, in which a reward function is learnt from hu-
man data, and then the structure of the reward function
is exploited in order to identify optimal interactive actions
(Sadigh et al. 2016, 2018). Fisac et al. (2019) proposes a
similar approach, although they do not rely on knowing the
structure of the reward function in their planning, only that
the reward function is known and accurate. These works for-
mulate the interaction problem as a two-person Stackelberg
game (Von Stackelberg 2010) with a dense reward, assum-
ing that the other agents in the environment abide by the
leader-follower hierarchy specified.
All of these approaches to modelling interaction with
Stackelberg games require the roles of leader and follower
to be agreed upon beforehand in order to avoid undesirable
behaviour. Our theoretical analysis shows that the method
we propose is less vulnerable to this ambiguity than these
previous approaches.
3 Conflict in the Stackelberg Game
In a two-person Stackelberg game one player takes the role
of the leader and the other the role of the follower. The leader
chooses the action that maximises their reward under the as-
sumption that the follower will behave optimally with re-
spect to the leader’s choice. For example, using the reward
matrix given in Figure 1b, if C1 were the leader then they
would choose to lane change ahead of C2 (and get reward
of 1) anticipating that the follower, C2 will choose to give
way in response (and get a reward of 0). However, if C2
were the leader instead, they would choose to continue (and
get reward 1) and C1 would be forced to decelerate. Thus, if
both cars independently assume the role of leader, C1 will
attempt a lane change and C2 will not give way. This ex-
ample shows that a conflict can emerge if it has not been
agreed in advance which agent is the leader and which agent
is the follower. In the case of autonomous driving, without
any means of direct communication, no such agreement can
be reached. We define conflict as follows:
Definition. Conflict occurs in a Stackelberg game when a
lack of agreement about who takes the role of leader and
who takes the role of follower leads to the players arriving
at different pure strategy equilibria.
Conflicts can be resolved in one of two ways: (i) enabling
players to negotiate the roles of leader and follower before
playing the game, or (ii) designing the reward such that the
players will arrive at the same pure strategy equilibrium ir-
respective of who takes the role of leader or follower.
Conflicts can be problematic as they can result in unfore-
seen catastrophic situations, as shown in the previous ex-
ample. Therefore it is important that the decision-making
method used by an AV has as low an incidence of conflict
possible, so that it is robust to the aggressiveness of other
agents. In our example it is clear from the reward matrix
that the players are in conflict, and there is no clear way to
resolve it.
4 Impact of Conflict
In this section we show how conflict can impact the ability
of an agent to accomplish its objective in a safe and timely
fashion. We consider the four possibilities; both agents plan
assuming they are the leader, both agents agree Car 1 is the
leader, both agents agree Car 2 is the leader, and both agents
think the other is the leader. When the agents do not agree,
which can occur if there is conflict in the game, they will
compute different equilibria to the game. We demonstrate
in various simulated driving scenarios, that this conflict can
result in longer objective completion times.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Each agent i has a finite set of intentions, Ai, with each in-
tention associated with a cost function, Ja : XT → R, a ∈
Ai, where X is the state space and T is the trajectory du-
ration. An equilibrium to a game, (ai, a−i), defines a cost
function, Ji = Jai + Ja−i . Each agent i uses the cost func-
tion Ji compute an optimal trajectory to achieve the joint
intentions. We treat the problem as a receding horizon op-
timal control problem, and use a Model Predictive Control
(MPC) planning scheme to solve it.
The vehicle’s state is defined by its x and y position as
well as its velocity and heading; ~x = [x, y, v, θ] ∈ X . Ve-
hicles can control their linear acceleration, a,and angular
acceleration,ω. Control inputs are of the form ~u = (a, ω).
The standard bicycle model, F : X × R2 → X (Kong et al.
2015) is used to define the vehicle dynamics. Vehicles are
rectangular with length L = 4.6 metres and width W = 2
metres. Each lane is 4 metres wide.
At every iteration of the MPC, each agent generates a tra-
jectory x∗i = {~xti}, u∗i = {~uti}Tt=0 such that
x∗i , u
∗
i , x
∗
−i, u
∗
−i = argmin
xi,ui,x−i,u−i
Ji(xi, ui, x−i, u−i)
s.t. ~xt+1j = F (~x
t
j , ~u
t
j) ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T, j ∈ {i,−i}
g(xj) ≤ 0, j ∈ {i,−i}
h(uj) ≤ 0, j ∈ {i,−i}
(~xti[0]− ~xt−i[0])2
a2
+
(~xti[1]− ~xt−i[1])2
b2
≥ 1.
For each agent i this method also produces x∗−i, u
∗
−i which
is the presumed trajectory agent −i will follow, presuming
their trajectory is also optimal with respect to Ji (this will
be the case if the agents are not in conflict as they will have
computed the same equilibrium). These values are discarded
by agent i. The vehicles then follow their respective optimal
trajectories for 2 timesteps before replanning. We presume
that at the time of planning the agents have perfect aware-
ness of each other’s states. A lookahead horizon of T = 4
seconds is used, with a timestep, dt = .2 seconds. The ex-
periment finishes when both agents have completed their ob-
jective, or if the trajectory duration exceeds 10 seconds.
Constraints, g, are applied to the physical state of each
agent; these ensure the vehicles stay on the road, and that
each vehicle’s velocity does not exceed 15m/s. Action
constraints, h, enforce that acceleration is in the range of
[−9m/s2, 3m/s2], and the angular acceleration is in the
range [−1deg/s2, 1deg/s2]. The final constraint is an ob-
stacle avoidance constraint, to ensure that the vehicles do
not construct plans that in which collisions occur. An el-
lipse with semi-major and semi-minor axes a and b is fit
around agent i’s position, preventing the vehicles from get-
ting too close. In all experiments a =W + δ and b = L+ 
where  and δ are small constants. An Interior Point Op-
timizer (IPOPT) method from the CasADi optimisation li-
brary (Andersson et al. 2019) is used to solve the non-linear
programming problem.
We record the time taken for both agents to complete
their objectives, as measured by a boolean check based on
the intention specified in the computed equilibrium. Tra-
jectories that fail to complete both agent’s objectives (e.g.,
due to a collision or frozen robot problem (Trautman and
Krause 2010)) are given a maximal score. The hypothesis is
that conflict interferes with the ability to interact effectively,
hence the time for the objectives to be completed will be
longer for those sets of leader-follower assumptions that are
in conflict. We evaluate this claim by staggering the start-
ing positions of each vehicle and recording the completion
times. The vehicles are displaced to a maximum displace-
ment of 1.5 vehicle lengths (6.9 metres). Empirically we ob-
serve that outside this range the cars cease to be interacting
and can generally accomplish their objectives without influ-
encing the other’s behaviour.
4.2 Experiment 1: Lane Change
Figure 1a demonstrates the default setup for the lane change
experiment; both cars start next to each other in adjacent
lanes, travelling at the speed limit. Car 1 (Orange) can ei-
ther choose to change lanes ahead (LCA) of Car 2 (Pur-
ple), or change lanes behind (LCB). Car 2 can either Give
Way (GW) to allow Car 1 to perform the lane change ahead,
or else they can continue (C). Car 1 would prefer to merge
ahead of Car 2, but Car 2 would prefer not to give way, which
would prevent Car 1 from merging ahead (this is captured in
the reward matrix defined in Figure 1b). If Car 1 believes
they are the leader, they will optimise for the equilibrium
(LCA,GW ), whereas, using the same assumption, C2 will
optimise (LCB,C). As these equilibria do not match, we
conclude the game is in conflict.
All Ja, a ∈ Ai ∪ A−i in this experiment have common
features incentivising the vehicles to get into the right hand
lane as early as possible, and to drive at the speed limit as
much as possible. These features all have the same weight,
so that neither agent’s cost function gives them more of an
incentive to reach their objective than the other. The remain-
ing feature penalises an agent i for being ahead of agent −i
if agent i is expected to give way. This is given as
f(~xi, ~x−i) = max(~xi[1]− ~x−i[1], 0)
The weights of all features are fit experimentally, and all fea-
tures have positive non-zero weight.
The results in Figure 2 demonstrate that when both
agents decide on the same equilibrium (e.g. in the case of
(LCA,GW ) and (LCB,C)) the cars are consistently able
to resolve the scenario cooperatively in less time than in con-
flict. If both cars presume the other car is the leader in the
Stackelberg game, they both attempt to accommodate the
other, effectively achieving the equilibrium (LCB,GW ),
and they fail to complete their objectives. Similarly, when
both cars presume they are the leader, they effectively ex-
ecute the (LCA,C) solution. In this case the cars almost
always fail to complete the task safely. Even when the cars
are not in conflict, if Car 2 started ahead of Car 1, and Car 1
is attempting to merge ahead, this can result in a collision, so
conflict does not entirely eliminate the risk in the manoeu-
vre.
4.3 Experiment 2: Intersection
Another scenario where conflict can emerge is at an
unsignalised intersection, where two cars wish to pass
through an intersection safely but also as quickly as possi-
ble. We omit social conventions encouraging an agreed upon
hierarchy, and instead consider the case where each agent
would prefer to be first through the intersection. This sce-
nario is depicted in Figure 3.
In this scenario each vehicle has the option to continue
through the intersection (C), or to give way to the other car
allowing them to proceed. In the case both cars assume they
are the leader in the Stackelberg game, both will expect the
other to give way ((C,GW ) and (GW,C), respectively).
Since these equilibria do not match, there is conflict in this
situation. If both agents presume they are the leader the ef-
fective solution executed is (C,C), which will result in them
proceeding through the intersection at the same time, and
each will interfere with the other’s ability to achieve their
objective. In the case both presume the other is the leader,
(a)
C1 Action C2 Action Average Time (s)
LCA C 9.89
LCA GW 6.25
LCB C 4.87
LCB GW 10.0
(b)
Figure 2: Results from Experiment 1. (a) Individual results
from the staggered experiments. Each plot depicts the results
for a different action combination, as a result of different as-
sumptions about the role of leader and follower. The x-axis
of each plot gives offset of Car 1 (Orange), and the y-axis
gives the offset for Car 2 (Purple) from the default position.
(b) The average trajectory duration achieved over all the ex-
periments for each altruism value pair.
they will both wait for the other to proceed, (GW,GW ), re-
sulting in neither achieving their objective.
In the default setup for this experiment each car starts with
0 velocity, equidistant from the intersection on perpendicu-
lar roads, as shown in Figure 3a. The the speed limit and ac-
celeration constraints are the same as in the previous experi-
ment. In the optimal planning problem we constrain both ve-
hicles’ ability to turn as, while trajectories that weave around
other vehicles would be valid solutions to the problem, such
trajectories would be considered dangerous in this setting in
real life.
In order to motivate the giving way behaviour, we define
the feature
f(~xi, ~xi, θLi) = cos(θLi) ∗max(~x−i[0]− ~xi[0], 0)+
sin(θLi) ∗max(~x−i[1]− ~xi[1], 0),
where θLi is the angle of the lane that agent i is on. This
feature has positive non-zero weight in Jai if agent i plans
on proceeding ahead of agent −i (C), and it penalises agent
i for being behind −i along the direction to their objective.
The remaining features correspond to staying in the lane and
motivating the agent to accelerate to the speed limit if possi-
(a)
C2
GW C
C1
GW (−∞,−∞) (0, 1)
C (1, 0) (−∞,−∞)
(b)
Figure 3: (a): Experimental setup for intersection experi-
ment; Car 1 (Orange) and Car 2 (Purple) wish to cross
straight through the intersection. Each has the option to pro-
ceed through the intersection promptly (C), or to give way
and let the other car proceed first (GW ). (b) Reward matrix
associated with the experiment; each car would prefer to get
through the intersection promptly. Diagonal entries in table
represent states where either both vehicles collide or neither
agent’s objective is satisfied, which is mutually undesirable.
ble, and to pass their objective. Empirical methods are used
to set the weights on these features.
Figure 4 gives the results of our experiments. As in our
previous experiment, we observe that when the agents agree
on the role of the leader and follower in the game, the aver-
age objective completion time is lower than in conflict. We
also observe that, in general, these execution times are con-
sistently lower. Unlike in our previous experiment, we ob-
serve that in the aggressive conflict case (bottom left cell in
Figure 4a) catastrophic failures (i.e. where the objective was
not achieved within the allotted time) occur close to the diag-
onal entries. This is a due to the fact that in this case the cars
can achieve their objectives, for certain initial states, without
accounting for the other vehicle significantly; if one car is
relatively much further away from the intersection than the
other, then the other car can proceed to achieve their objec-
tive without interacting with the distant car. We observe that,
paradoxically, in this case shorter durations were achieved
when one car was as far away as possible, with the other
as close as possible, with other combinations resulting in
longer durations as the cars interact more significantly.
5 Altruism and Area of Conflict
Altruism-based techniques for decision making in game the-
ory can be thought of as methods for transforming the re-
ward matrix of a game. In this section we will define our
(a)
C1 Action C2 Action Average Time (s)
C C 6.88
C GW 4.97
GW C 4.28
GW GW 10.0
(b)
Figure 4: Results from Experiment 2. (a) Individual results
from the staggered experiments. Each plot depicts the results
from following a different pair of objectives. The x-axis of
each plot gives offset of Car 1 (Orange), and the y-axis gives
the offset for Car 2 (Purple) from the default position. Vehi-
cles are offset parallel to the lane they are on. (b) The aver-
age trajectory duration achieved over all the experiments for
each objective combination.
variant of altruism (Andreoni and Miller 1993), as well as
an augmentation to the definition that accounts for the recip-
rocal considerations of other altruistic agents. We will also
provide a definition for Area of Conflict.
5.1 Altruism
We model the interactive driving decision-making problem
as a static game played on a reward matrix, indexed by in-
tentions, where each cell in the matrix contains the rewards
received by each player if they each chose the correspond-
ing intention combination. Figure 5 presents a general re-
ward matrix where if the row player, R, and column player
C, chose intentions A1,B1 respectively, R would receive a
reward of r111 and C would receive a reward of r112. The
grid is 2× 2 for demonstrative purposes and, in general, the
grid can be of any size M × N where M is the number of
actions available to R and N is the number of actions avail-
able toC, and each cell contains a reward pair (rmn1, rmn2).
Unless the full index is required, we will refer to the row
player’s reward for a particular intention combination as r1
and, correspondingly, r2 for the column player’s reward.
Pure Altruism, as defined in Andreoni and Miller (1993),
CB1 B2
R
A1 (r111, r112) (r121, r122)
A2 (r211, r212) (r221, r222)
Figure 5: General reward matrix
makes use of an altruism coefficient α to define the altruistic
reward,
r∗i = ri + αr−i 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (1)
where the −i index corresponds to the agent that is not in-
dexed by i, and r∗i is the effective reward agent i uses to
perform decision-making. If α = 0 then the agents are
indifferent to one another and if the value is 1 then the
agents are cooperating in order to maximise the same re-
ward, r∗i = r
∗
−i = ri + r−i.
As an alternative to Pure Altruism we propose an alterna-
tive definition for the altruistic reward,
r∗i = (1− αi)ri + αir−i 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. (2)
In this case each agent i has their own individual altruism co-
efficient, αi. Scaling agent i’s reward in parallel with agent
−i’s allows for more flexible behaviours as compared with
Pure Altruism; if αi = 0 then the agent is wholly egoistic,
if αi = 1 then the agent is wholly altruistic. To avoid confu-
sion we will refer to the Andreoni and Miller (1993) altruism
as “pure altruism” and our proposed definition as “altruism”.
Extensive previous and ongoing work has been dedi-
cated to estimating reward functions and interactive pa-
rameters (Albrecht, Crandall, and Ramamoorthy 2016; Al-
brecht and Stone 2019; Albrecht et al. 2020; Schwart-
ing et al. 2019). In this work we presume that the
“true” reward matrix {(rmn1, rmn2)}0<m≤M,0<n≤N , and
altruism values α1, α2 are known to both agents. Each
agent can then, independently, construct the reward ma-
trix {(r∗mn1, r∗mn2)}0<m≤M,0<n≤N , which they will use to
choose which intention to follow.
5.2 Augmented Altruism
When attempting to identify equilibria in Game Theoretic
problem formulations it is not uncommon to use iterative
best response methods to compute the Nash Equilibrium
(Vorobeychik and Wellman 2008). In practise this involves
each agent choosing an optimal action based on the optimal
actions for the other agents in the previous iteration. This
allows for the fact that an agent’s choice of action can be af-
fected by the choices made by other agents. If this process is
repeated indefinitely, and it converges to a solution, then the
solution achieved is a Nash Equilibrium (Bas¸ar and Olsder
1998).
The altruism definition presented in Equation 2 neglects
from consideration that r∗−i is the reward an altruistic agent−i would receive from the interaction, not r−i, and that
awareness of this value could affect agent i’s preferences.
But, by the same assumption, the value for r∗−i depends on
the value of r∗i . By treating the equations in Equation 2 as
a system of equations, we can determine the steady state of
the system, yielding what we refer to as augmented altruism,
r∗i =
(1− αi)ri + αi(1− α−i)r−i
1− αiα−i i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
This is an improvement on our base altruism definition,
as it is a computationally tractable method for account-
ing for both players altruism values when evaluating op-
tions, whereas the original definition only accounted for the
agent’s own α. We refer the reader to the Appendix A.1 for
a more detailed explanation and complete derivation.
5.3 Area of Conflict
Altruism can be used to resolve conflict scenarios; in the
example in Figure 1b, if α1 = 1, for instance, thenC1would
get an effective reward of 0 for attempting to cut ahead, and
a reward of 1 for decelerating and allowing C2 to proceed.
However, altruism does not entirely eliminate conflict since
α1 = 1 and α2 = 1 also results in conflict.
Let each agent choose an action according to fI :
RM×N× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ {A1, A2}×{B1, B2}, a function
parameterised by the altruism coefficients that maps from
the reward matrix to the equilibrium of the corresponding
Stackelberg game for some reward matrix I . The previous
observation indicates that, for a given reward matrix, there
are potentially regions in the parameter-space [0, 1] × [0, 1]
that will always result in conflict. We call the total size of
these regions the Area of Conflict (AoC). It is desirable to
choose a decision-making method that minimises the AoC
for a given reward matrix.
In the following derivations we will refer to the reward
matrix defined in Figure 5. Without loss of generality we
will assume the cell (A2, B1) is optimal forR and (A1, B2)
is optimal for C. We further assume that there are no ambi-
guities in each agents’ rewards, i.e.
r211 >r121, r111, r221
r122 >r212, r112, r222.
(4)
It is clear that decision-making on the reward matrix with
these constraints will result in conflict, regardless of the
value of the parameters. Therefore it is vacuously true that
if I is the unchanged reward matrix, then the AoC of the re-
sulting Stackelberg game is 1 (Von Stackelberg 2010). We
will use this value as a baseline.
In general we observe that conflict will occur if:
(r∗211 > r
∗
121 ∧ r∗122 > r∗212)
∨(r∗211 < r∗121 ∧ r∗122 < r∗212)
(5)
The definition of the AoC for the following decision-making
models follows from Equation 5 (In order to save space we
will let A = r211 − r121 and B = r122 − r212):
• Pure Altruism: (α1 > AB∧α2 > BA )∨(α1 < AB∧α2 < BA )
• Altruism: (α1 > AB+A∧α2 > BB+A )∨(α1 < AB+A∧α2 <
B
B+A )
• Augmented Altruism:
(1− 1−α1α1 AB < α2 < BB+(1−α1A) ∧ 0 < α1 < 1)
Table 1: Calculated AoC values for various interactive decision-making models based on the lane change reward matrix given
in Figure 1b, and general expressions for computing the AoC for each of the methods considered.
Method Lane Change AoC General AoC
Baseline (Von Stackelberg 2010) 1 1
Pure Altruism (Andreoni and Miller 1993) 1 min(AB ,
B
A )
SVO (Schwarting et al. 2019) 0.5 p1p2+(
pi
2−p1)(pi2−p2)
(pi2 )
2
Altruism (Ours) 0.5 2( AB(A+B)2 )
Aug-Altruism (Ours) 0.38623 ln(A+B)(AB +
B
A )− (AB ln(A) + BA ln(B))− 1
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 6: Conflict regions for various reward models corresponding to the reward matrix in Figure 1b. Red regions designate
regions in the parameter space that result in conflict. Plots correspond to: (a) Baseline, (b) Pure Altruism, (c) SVO, (d) Altruism,
(e) Augmented Altruism.
In the above it also holds that 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, except in the
case of augmented altruism, where there is the extra con-
straint that 0 < α1 < 1. Each of the logical conjunctions
(∧) specifies a bounded region of parameter space which
will result in conflict, and the logical disjunctions (∨) define
pairs of non-overlapping regions (see Figure 6 for a graphi-
cal depiction of these regions). Therefore we can define the
AoC as the sum of the areas of these regions in parameter
space. For Pure Altruism, and our proposed Altruism, these
are straightforward computations. For the remaining deriva-
tions we refer the reader to Appendix B. The general defi-
nitions for AoC of the standard Stackelberg Game, the Pure
Altruism, SVO, Altruism, and Augmented Altruism variants
are provided in Table 1 as well as evaluations corresponding
to the reward matrix in Figure 1b.
We observe that the AoC for the Augmented Altruism
significantly outperforms the other considered models. This
means that, in repeated pairings of agents with altruism
scores sampled uniformly from [0, 1], the incidence of con-
flict would be lowest when using this model. In general
we empirically observe that, for reasonable magnitudes of
A
B Augmented Altruism consistently outperforms the other
models. Figure 7a shows the AoC plotted against A, when
B = 1. We observe that for 0.33 < A < 3 Augmented Al-
truism achieves minimal values. From Figure 7b we see that
when B = 3.5 this range is 1.6 < A < 10.4. This demon-
strates the effectiveness of the proposed model for minimis-
ing conflict.
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Plot of the AoC for varying values of A. The Blue
line corresponds to Altruism, the Green SVO, and the Purple
Augmented Altruism. (a) B = 1, (b) B = 3.5.
6 Conclusion
In this work we identified conflict, a vulnerability in popular
decision methods for autonomous driving. We experimen-
tally demonstrated the significant negative consequences
conflict can have in common interactive driving scenar-
ios. We proposed a metric, Area of Conflict, that measures
the potential incidence of conflict for a decision-making
method. We derived a novel method for adjusting the values
used in decision-making in such a way to reduce the meth-
ods vulnerability, and provided theoretical guarantees that
the methods reduce the incidence of conflict for reasonable
reward values.
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A Appendices
A.1 Deriving Augmented Altruism
When attempting to identify equilibria in Game Theoretic
problem formulations it is not uncommon to used iterative
best response methods to compute the Nash Equilibrium
(Vorobeychik and Wellman 2008). In practise this involves
each agent choosing an optimal action based on the optimal
actions for the other agents in the previous iteration. This
allows for the fact that an agent’s choice of action can be af-
fected by the choices made by other agents. If this process is
repeated indefinitely, and it converges to a solution, then the
solution achieved is a Nash Equilibrium (Bas¸ar and Olsder
1998).
The altruism definition presented in Equation 2 neglects
from consideration that r∗−i is the reward an altruistic agent−i would receive from the interaction, not r−i, and that
awareness of this value could affect agent i’s preferences.
But, by the same assumption, the value for r∗−i depends on
the value of r∗i .Therefore, in order to adequately account
for the altruistic inclinations of both agents, we use itera-
tive methods over the system of equations in Equation 2. We
observe that repeated iteration over the system of equations
allows each agent to account for the other’s altruistic coeffi-
cient; after each agent computes their altruistic reward once,
they can repeat the process using the rewards computed in
the previous iteration. This gives us the following system of
equations:
rk1 = (1− α1)r1 + α1rk−12
rk2 = (1− α2)r2 + α2rk−11 ,
(6)
where k ≥ 0 gives the iteration index. Agent i does not it-
erate over reward ri as the amount of reward they would get
from achieving their own objective, (1 − αi)ri, is known
and does not need to be optimised. Since the altruism coef-
ficients are bounded, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, we know this system will
converge (provided α1 and α2 are not both exactly 1, as this
renders the computation unsolvable). We can find the steady
state for this system by solving:
r∞1 = (1− α1)r1 + α1r∞2
r∞2 = (1− α2)r2 + α2r∞1
(7)
This solution gives the definition of the altruistic reward
presented in Equation 3.
r∗i =
(1− αi)ri + αi(1− α−i)r−i
1− αiα−i i ∈ {1, 2} (8)
B Deriving Area of Conflict
We recall that conflict will occur for Augmented Altruism
if:
(1− 1− α1
α1
A
B
< α2 <
B
B + (1− α1A) ∧ 0 < α1 < 1)
(9)
By solving these inequalities we get the following definition
for AoC (With A = r211 − r121 and B = r122 − r212):
AoC =
∫ 1
0
B
B + (1− α)Adα−
∫ 1
A
A+B
1− 1− α
α
A
B
dα
= ln(A+B)(
A
B
+
B
A
)− (A
B
ln(A) +
B
A
ln(B))− 1
(10)
For comparison we can also perform the same evaluation
for SVO (Schwarting et al. (2019)).
r∗i = cos(θi)ri + sin(θi)r−i 0 ≤ θi ≤ 2pi (11)
By the same procedure as before we observe that conflict
occurs with SVO when:
(θ1 < tan
−1(
A
B
) ∧ θ2 < tan−1(B
A
))
∨(θ1 > tan−1(A
B
) ∧ θ2 > tan−1(B
A
))
(12)
Even though the SVO mechanism allows for masochistic
and sadistic behaviours (corresponding to angles resulting in
coefficients with negative magnitudes), to facilitate compar-
ison we constrain the SVO coefficients to be between 0 and
1. This implies 0 < θi < pi2 . We can therefore compute the
AoC for SVO as:
p1 = max(0,min(
pi
2
, tan−1(
A
B
)))
p2 = max(0,min(
pi
2
, tan−1(
B
A
)))
AoC =
p1p2 + (
pi
2 − p1)(pi2 − p2)
(pi2 )
2
(13)
